NATO deployment in the Aegean Sea and Greek issues of concern

The recent decision by the Greek and Turkish governments, albeit after much political pressure been applied by the EU, to allow deployment of a NATO fleet in the Aegean Sea should raise some fundamental issues of concern for Greece. 

The NATO fleet is said to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance to provide information to Greece, Turkey and the EU (via its agency Frontex) to deal with traffickers and help stem refugees entering Greece from Turkey.

However, both NATO and the EU have never recognized Greece’s territorial sea borders nor have they accepted Greece’s declared airspace zone. Indeed, both organisations have been a "hesitant observer" in this regard. Both have traditionally chosen to adopt a “hands off” policy toward Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean Sea and have refrained from undertaking any active dispute resolution measures.

As such, the recent declaration by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg on Standing Maritime Group 2 that:

“Greek and Turkish forces will not operate in each other’s territorial waters and airspace” and that “NATO vessels can deploy in the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey” 

assumes that such waters and airspace have been agreed upon. This cannot be further from the truth and therein lay the following concerns for Greece:

• Greece has declared a 10 nautical mile territorial air defense zone for aviation and air policing purposes. Turkey objects to this declaration and only recognizes Greek sovereignty over 6 nautical miles. Will Greek airplanes be precluded from operating in the “disputed” 4 nautical mile zone? 
• Turkey erroneously challenges the sovereignty of numerous small islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean Sea that, according to Turkey, have not been specifically ceded to Greece by way of international treaties. Will Greek ships and planes be precluded from operating in Greece’s declared territorial sea and airspace zones emanating from these islands? 
• Will Greek vessels and airplanes be limited to operate only at non contested waters and airspace? If so, could this not potentially be exploited by Turkey and used to set a precedent for claims over disputed territorial waters and airspace zones?
• Greece has consistently refused to concede that a territorial sea dispute per se exists with Turkey but rather promotes the view that the claims made by Turkey are unilateral in nature. Does the agreed NATO deployment affect this position?

The above questions reflect serious concerns which emanate from the current presence of NATO forces in the Aegean Sea. One hopes that the Greek government has appropriately considered these issues and has mitigated all risks. There is no doubt that Greece must actively work towards appropriately dealing with the unfolding humanitarian crisis and should engage the international community to help do so. However, the presence of NATO forces should not constitute a de-facto dereliction of Greek entitlements and sovereignty in the Aegean Sea.

by Vasilis Giavris (Lawyer & Political Scientist) 

http://vasilisgiavris.blogspot.com.au/

Aegean Sea Dispute in Context: Delimitation of the Continental Shelf

by Vasilis Giavris - Lawyer & Political Scientist

It is generally accepted that the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary in the Aegean Sea first became an issue of contention between Greece and Turkey on November 1, 1973 when the Turkish government decided to unilaterally grant permits to the Turkish State Petroleum Company for the exploration and exploitation of the seabed of the Aegean Sea surrounding the Greek islands of Samothrace, Limnos, Agios Eustratios, Lesbos, Chios, Psara and Antipsara. Turkey followed this decision by publishing in the Turkish Government Gazette a map which effectively drew the line of delimitation between Greece and Turkey in the middle of the Aegean Sea and failed to account for the existence of the Greek islands. 

Turkey’s actions drew an immediate protest from the Greek Government which on 7 February 1974 addressed a Note Verbale to the government of Turkey in which it disputed the validity of Turkey’s actions and reserved Greece’s sovereign rights over the continental shelf of the above named islands (Greek Note Verbale No.6243-29/AS 103, 7 February 1974). Whilst both states initially agreed to enter into some form of negotiations to deal with the issue in dispute this agreement was quickly abandoned as a result of the illegal invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974 and by the Turkish decision in 1976 to authorize further Turkish ships to undertake explorations in the disputed areas. 

Nature of dispute 

There is a divergence of opinion as to the exact limit of the dispute in question. Greece perceives the dispute to be limited to the continental shelf adjacent to the Greek islands of Samothrace, Limnos, Agios Eustratios, Lesbos, Chios, Psara, Antipsara, Samos, Ikaria, and the islands comprising the Dodecanese group. On the contrary, Turkey maintains the view that the dispute applies to the whole of the Aegean Sea and as such is not limited to particular islands.

Both states revert to legal arguments to support their respective claims. Greece correctly articulates the view that islands are entitled to their own continental shelf and in this regard points to Article 1(b) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 which states that the term “continental shelf” also applies to the seabed and subsoil of submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. Greece further relies on Article 121(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS III) which states that “the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory” and as such, according to Greece, reinforces the argument that islands do have their own economic zone and continental shelf. 

Finally, Greece quite rightly points to Article 6(1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 which states that in circumstances where an agreement cannot be reached between states, and unless there are special circumstances that justify another determination, the boundary is to be determined by a median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baseline of each state (Greek Note Verbale No.6243-29/AS 103, 7 February 1974). According to Greece, this point can only be the median line between the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean and the Turkish coast..

Turkey, which is not a signatory of UNCLOS III, refuses to be bound by its provisions. It denies that Greek islands possess continental shelves of their own but rather ironically perceives them as “protuberances” of the Turkish continental shelf and a “prolongation of the Anatolian landmass”. Turkey further claims that “special” circumstances apply to the Aegean Sea. In particular, Turkey claims that failing to achieve agreement on the delimitation line then both states need to define their respective continental shelf areas by taking into consideration factors such as the “geomorphologic and geological structure of the shelf” and special circumstances including the “general configuration of the respective coasts, the existence of islands, islets or rocks of one State on the continental shelf of the other”. 

Greece does not accept the special circumstances claimed by Turkey. On the contrary, it claims that if special circumstances are deemed to exist they must favour Greece since the “Archipelagic unity” of the Greek islands should not be interrupted by the imposition of Turkey’s continental shelf.     

It is imperative that Greece continues to make it clear to all and sundry that resolution to long standing disputes can only be achieved by insisting on the implementation of United Nations Resolutions, International Conventions, European Acquis and International Law.